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AN EASY PILL TO SWALLOW: WHILE THE SUPREME 
COURT FOUND THAT FOR-PROFIT, SECULAR COMPANIES 
CAN EXERCISE RELIGION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT, THE MANDATE 
SHOULD HAVE PREVAILED WITH RESPECT TO THOSE 
ENTITIES BECAUSE IT ADVANCES THE GOVERNMENT'S 
COMPELLING INTERESTS IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND IS THE 
LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS OF DOING SO 
Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, 
when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be 
kicked?! 
-Edward, First Baron Thurlow 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From its inception to its implementation, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (the ACA), commonly known as "Obamacare," 
has been no stranger to controversy.2 A key component promulgated 
under the ACA is the so-called "contraceptive mandate" (the 
Mandate). 3 Because women face significantly higher health care 
costs than men, women ultimately forego receiving necessary 
medical care.4 The Mandate was enacted to address the unique health 
needs of women, particularly with respect to their reproductive 
capacities.5 
The Mandate seeks to provide women with greater access to 
preventive health services by requiring that certain employers provide 
1. Mervyn King, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 1 (Richard Stone ed., Halsted 
Press 1977) (quoting Edward Baron Thurlow 1731-1806). 
2. Gregory Wallace, 'Obamacare ': The Word that Defined the Health Care Debate, 
CNN POLITICS (June 25, 2012, 1:20 AM), http://www.cnn.comJ2012/06/25/politics/ 
obamacare-word-debate/index.html? _ s=PM:POLITICS. 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). 
4. See infra Part Il.A. 
5. See infra Part Il.A. 
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their employees with health insurance that covers approved 
contraceptive methods without cost-sharing.6 
While the Mandate may be the greatest piece of legislation for 
women's health in a generation,7 it received opposition from religious 
groups, who perceive the Mandate as an attempt by the government 
to force them into violating their religious beliefs.s In response to 
this opposition, the Obama Administration made certain concessions 
for certain groups, while simultaneously permitting women's access 
to these services.9 Despite these attempts to compromise, the 
opposition stands strong. Nearly 100 companies, nonprofits, and 
religious groups challenged the contraception requirement on 
constitutional and federal law grounds. 10 Until recently, courts were 
split on these issues. ll As of November 26,2013, the Supreme Court 
agreed to review the religious challenges of a government case l2 and 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). Cost-sharing is defined as "any expenditure required by 
or on behalf of an enrollee with respect to essential health benefits; such teno includes 
deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, or similar charges, but excludes premiums, 
balance billing amounts for non-network providers, and spending for non-covered 
services." 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2013). 
7. See, e.g., NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., DENYING COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTIVES 
HARMS WOMEN 1-2, available at http://www.nwlc.orglsites/defaultlfiles/pdfs/ 
denying_covg_oCcont_harrns_ women_ 081312ydf.pdf. 
8. See, e.g., Letter from Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Michael F. Moses, Assoc. Gen. 
Sec'y & Gen. Counsel, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, to the Dept. of Health & 
Human Servs. 1-4 (May 15, 2012), http://www.usccb.orglaboutlgeneral-
counsellrulemakingluploadlcomrnents-on-advance-notice-of-proposed-rulemaking-
on-preventive-services-12-05-15.pdf. 
9. Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 39,870, 39,870 (July 2, 2013) (codified at Treas. Reg. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pts. 
2510,2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156). 
10. HHS Mandate Information Central, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.orglhhsinformationcentral(lastvisitedJan.ll. 2015}. 
11. Compare Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 417 
(E.D. Pa. 2013), rev'd sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. 
Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 2014 WL 4467879 (3d Cir. Aug. 5,2014) (holding 
that the ACA exemption regarding women's contraception as applicable to religious 
employers does not violate the Establishment Clause), and Grote Indus., L.L.c. v. 
Sebelius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943, 954 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (holding that there was a 
substantial likelihood that the ACA religious employer exemption did not violate the 
Establishment Clause), with Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 
1121 (10th Cir. 2013), ajJ'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014) (holding that the companies' rights had been substantially burdened by 
the ACA's contraceptive-mandate requirement), and Tyndale House Publishers Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 130 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that the employer would 
likely succeed on his ACA challenge). 
12. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1120-21. 
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a private business case. 13 On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court 
announced its decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, finding, in a 5-4 
decision, that the Mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, 
violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).14 
This Comment will discuss the background of the ACA's 
contraceptive mandate and the religious claims against the Mandate 
made under the RFRA. Part III.A will argue that for-profit 
businesses should not assert the same claims of religious freedom as 
individuals and religious nonprofits under the RFRA.15 Part III.B 
will argue that even though the Court found that for-profit 
corporations may assert the same claims of religious freedom as 
individuals and religious nonprofits,16 any burden on employers does 
not rise to a "substantial" burden,17 and the Mandate is the least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. 18 
II. THE MANDATE, THE CONTROVERSY, AND THE 
OPPOSITION 
A. Addressing the Inequities and Amending the ACA 
The ACA "expands access to [health insurance] coverage [for] 
millions of uninsured women, ends discriminatory practices such as 
gender rating, . . . eliminates exclusions for preexisting conditions, 
and improves women's access to affordable ... care."19 However, 
when the bill was initially presented, it was devoid of essential 
women's preventive health services.20 Senator Barbara Mikulski, 
recognizing the pitfalls of such a plan, sponsored the Women's 
Health Amendment (WHA).21 The WHA proposed "requir[ing] 
13. Conestoga Wood, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 402. 
14. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
15. See irifra Part III.A. 
16. See infra Part III.B. 
17. See infra Part III.C. 
18. See infra Part VI. 
19. COMM'N ON PREVENTATIVE SERVS. FOR WOMEN, INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE 
SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 18 (2011), available at 
http://www.iom.edulreports/20111clinical-preventive-services-for-women-closing-the-
gaps.aspx [hereinafter CLOSING THE GAPS]. 
20. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, III th Congo (2009). 
21. Brief for the Nat'l Women's Law Ctr. & Sixty-Eight Other Orgs. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of the Gov't at 6, Burwell V. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356),2014 WL 333895, at *6. 
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coverage of women's preventive services developed by women's 
health experts to meet the unique needs ofwomen."22 
After Congress passed the WHA, the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA) commissioned the Institute of 
Medicine (10M) to develop comprehensive and evidence-based 
guidelines on the issue.23 The 10M's Report, conducted by a 
committee of independent experts in the relevant subjects, reiterated 
the need for women's preventive health services.24 The report 
indicated that although "women have longer life expectancies than 
men, women suffer from chronic disease and disability at rates 
disproportionate to those of men, with consequences for their own 
health and the health of their families."25 The 10M's report also 
indicated that women need more preventive care than men, due to 
their reproductive and gender specific conditions, which cause 
significant out-of-pocket expenditures for women.26 However, 
despite their obvious need for preventive care, many women forego 
receiving preventive services such as mammograms and Pap smears 
because of their associated costS.27 
The 10M identified multiple gaps in women's health services that 
needed to be addressed, and subsequently made recommendations to 
address those gaps.28 The committee recognized that contraception 
and contraceptive counseling were not in the array of health care 
services available to women.29 The committee concluded, based on 
available evidence, that contraception and contraceptive counseling 
are effective at reducing unintended pregnancies, which have very 
real, detrimental costs to the public.30 Thus, the committee 
recommended that the full range of Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA)-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and 
patient education and counseling for women with reproductive 
capacity become available under the ACA.31 
22. 155 Congo Rec. S12265-02 (daily ed. Dec.3, 2009) (statement of Sen. Stabenow). 
23. CLOSING THE GAPS, supra note 19, at 1-2. 
24. See id. at 18. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 19. 
27. Id. 
28. See id. at 79-134, 157-68. 
29. Id. at 109-10. 
30. See infra Part IV.A. 
31. See CLOSING THE GAPS, supra note 19, at 109-10. 
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B. Rectifying The Inequities 
On August 1, 2011, HRSA adopted and released guidelines for 
women's preventive health services based on the 10M's 
recommendations.32 The HRSA's guidelines include all FDA-
approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient 
education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity, as 
prescribed by a health care provider. 33 Following an administrative 
tug-of-war, the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
Labor and the Treasury ( the Departments) issued final rulings for 
women's preventive health services on July 2, 2013, encompassing 
the HRSA's guidelines.34 As a result, employers and insurers were 
mandated to provide coverage consistent with the HRSA's guidelines 
beginning on or after January 1,2014.35 
C. Exemptions and Accommodations 
Prior to the promulgation of the Final Rules, there was significant 
opposition to the Mandate from some religious groups and religiously 
affiliated employers.36 The breadth of the opposition to the Mandate 
comes from churches and synagogues, religious nonprofit businesses, 
and for profit, secular businesses -owned by religious individuals.37 
While many religious sects do not generally oppose contraception, 
they do generally object to "abortifacient drugs."38 An abortifacient 
is defined as a drug or device causing an abortion.39 Because the 
Mandate provides coverage for "emergency contraceptives" and 
intra-uterine devices, some religious groups object to the Mandate on 
the basis that these contraceptives avoid pregnancy by preventing a 
fertilized egg from implanting in the womb and are thus, 
abortifacients.40 
32. See 78 Fed. Reg. 127,39870 (July 2,2013) (codified at Treas. Reg. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. 
pts. 2510,2590; 45 C.F.R. 147, 156). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. See HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note 10. 
37. See id. 
38. See Colo. Christian Univ. v. Burwell, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.org/ccu/(iastvisitedJan.ll. 2015). 
39. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 6 (9th ed. 2009). 
40. See Julie Rovner, Morning-After Pills Don't Cause Abortion, Studies Say, NPR (Feb. 
21, 2013, 5 :04 PM), http://www.npr.orglblogs/healthl20 13/02/22/1725956891 
morning-after-pills-dont-cause-abortion-studies-say (discussing whether emergency 
contraceptives cause abortions). There is no consensus among the medical 
community about whether these drugs actually cause an abortion. See id. However, 
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Taking these religious beliefs into consideration, the Departments 
have delineated exemptions and accommodations for some religious 
organizations.41 The Final Rules provide exemptions for religious 
employers and "accommodations with respect to . . . group health 
plans established or maintained by eligible organizations ... as well 
as student health insurance coverage arranged by eligible 
organizations that are institutions of higher education."42 
1. Exemptions for Churches, Integrated Auxiliaries and 
Associations 
Prior to the Final Rule, the interim exemption was limited to non-
profit, religious employers whose purpose was the "inculcation of 
religious values" and primarily employed and served people of their 
own faith.43 Some objected to this rule on the grounds that it was too 
narrow because churches can serve others outside of their faith. 44 
The Departments responded by allowing the exemption to apply to all 
churches.45 
The Mandate defines a religious employer as one meets the 
following criteria: "(1) [h]as the inculcation of religious values as its 
purpose; (2) primarily employs persons who share its religious tenets; 
(3) primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is 
a nonprofit organization described in section 6033(a)(1) and 
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code."46 
These code sections refer "to churches, their integrated auxiliaries, 
and conventions or associations of churches, as well as to the 
exclusively religious activities of any religious order."47 The 
Departments justify this exemption because 
[h]ouses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries that 
object to contraceptive coverage on religious grounds are 
religious subscribers are entitled to believe that emergency contraception operates as 
an abortifacient and thus, as a matter of faith, coverage of such drugs would impose a 
substantial burden on religion. 
41. See generally 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,873-78 (July 2, 2013) (providing details 
regarding exemptions and accommodations for certain religious organizations under 
the Affordable Care Act). 
42. Id. at 39,873. 
43. See id. at 39,873-74 (providing the definitions of religious employer for exemption 
under the Affordable Care Act, prior to the final rule). 
44. See id. at 39,874 (describing feedback on the defmition of religious employer under 
the Affordable Care Act and the Department's response). 
45. Jd. 
46. Jd. at 39,873-74. 
47. Id. at 39,874. 
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more likely than other employers to employ people of the 
same faith who share the same objection, and who would 
therefore be less likely than other people to use such 
contraceptive services, even if such services were covered 
under their plan.48 
2. Accommodations for Nonprofit Religious Organizations 
347 
Groups that fall within the aforementioned religious employer 
exemption are entirely excused from complying with the Mandate. 
However, if an organization does not meet the definition's 
requirement, they are subject to the Mandate but may be eligible for 
an "accommodation" provided for in the Final Rules.49 The 
accommodation provides that an eligible organization be relieved of 
their obligation to cover the mandated contraceptives, but ensures 
that the contraceptives are still provided for without cost-sharing. so 
An eligible organization is one that: 
(1) [0 ]pposes providing coverage for some or all of the 
contraceptive services required to be covered for under 
section 2173 of the PHS Act and the companion provisions 
of ERISA and the Code on account of religious objections; 
(2) is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity; (3) holds 
itself out as a religious organization; and (4) self-certifies 
that it satisfies the first three criteria .... 51 
The process of self-certification merely requires that an 
organization that seeks to be eligible for an accommodation complete 
and execute a form provided by HHS representing the religious 
nonprofit's satisfaction of the eligibility criteria and maintain a record 
of the self-certification form. 52 The religious nonprofit must notify its 
health plan insurer that it objects to some or all of the mandated 
contraceptives. 53 The insurer administrator is then required to pay for 
48. ld. 
49. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874. The initial rule did not provide for an accommodation for 
any religiously sponsored hospitals, social service organizations, higher education 
institutions, or other nonprofit entities not exempt as churches. See id. at 39,871. 
50. See id. at 39,874. 
51. ld. 
52. 45 C.F.R. § 147.13 I (b)(4) (2013); see 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,875. 
53. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)(l). 
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the cost of the contraceptives without cost-sharing by plan 
participants or the objecting religious employer. 54 
The Departments maintain, based on numerous studies, that the 
accommodation is cost-neutral because insurers would be insuring 
the same set of individuals under both the group health insurance 
policies and the separate individual contraceptive policies. 55 As a 
result, insurers "would experience lower cost[] from improvements in 
women's health, healthier timing and spacing of pregnancies, and 
few[] unplanned pregnancies."56 
D. Opponents to the Mandate 
Despite the exemptions and accommodations provided in the final 
rule, there was still significant opposition from groups that do not 
qualify for relief from complying with the Mandate. If a non-exempt, 
non-eligible employer fails to comply with these regulations, it faces 
harsh penalties. 57 The penalty for a non-exempt employer that fails to 
provide health coverage for contraceptives is $100 per day per 
employee. 58 There are also annual penalties in place for employers 
who fail to provide coverage altogether for each employee. 59 
1. Nonprofit Religious Organizations 
Although most claims brought by churches have been dismissed or 
have otherwise gone inactive, there are still religious nonprofit 
organizations that are dissatisfied with the accommodation. For 
example, in Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, a temporary 
54. 45 C.F.R. § 147.13 1 (c)(2)(B)(ii). As of August 2014, in light of the Supreme Court's 
recent interim order in a case involving Wheaton College, interim final regulations 
were published to allow an eligible organization to notify HHS in writing of its 
religious objection to contraception coverage. Women's Preventative Servs. 
Coverage, Non-Profit Religious Organizations, and Closely-Held For-Profit Entities, 
CMS.Gov, http://cms.gov/CCIIOlResourceslFact-Sheets-and-FAQs/womens-preven-
0201 20 13.html (last visited Jan. 11,2015). 
ld. 
HHS will then notify the insurer for an insured health plan, or the 
Department of Labor will notify the [third-party administrator] for 
a self-insured plan[] that the organization objects to providing 
contraception coverage and that the insurer or [third-party 
administrator] is responsible for providing enrollees in the health 
plan" mandated coverage at no separate cost. 
55. 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,877. 
56. Jd. 
57. I.R.C. § 4980D(a)-(b)(2012). 
58. ld. at § 4980D(b)(I). 
59. ld. at § 4980H(a). 
2015 Easy Pill to Swallow 349 
injunction was issued before the Mandate was to take effect. 60 Little 
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged is a nonprofit corporation 
comprised of Roman Catholic nuns who serve needy elderly people. 61 
Although the nuns qualify for the self-certification accommodation, 
they refuse to fill out the self-certification form because they believe 
that the accommodation burdens their religious beliefs by triggering 
the Mandate, with the assistance of their third-party administrator.62 
The suit is a class action lawsuit, not only for the Little Sisters but 
also for other Catholic organizations that provide health benefits 
consistent with their religious faith through the Christian Brothers 
Employee Benefit Trust and Christian Brothers Services.63 
2. For-profit, Secular Businesses 
Leading up to the Court's recent decision in Hobby Lobby, for-
profit, secular businesses were at the front lines of the contraceptive 
mandate war. These companies object on the basis of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) , among other First 
Amendment objections.64 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
two cases: Hobby Lobby and Conestoga. 65 Hobby Lobby is a $3 
billion dollar, for-profit corporation that sells arts and crafts 
supplies. 66 The owners of Hobby Lobby and its sister company 
Mardel, the Greens, objected to the mandate because they believe that 
certain types of birth control devices and emergency contraceptives 
are "abortifacients. "67 
60. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 
893,893 (2013). 
61. Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.orgilittiesisters/(lastvisitedJan.11 , 2015). 
62. See id. Their third-party administrator, Christian Brothers Employee Benefit Trust, is 
also opposed to the Mandate since it would have to contract for, arrange for or 
otherwise facilitate the provision of abortifacients. See id.; see also Aamer Madhani 
& Doug Stanglin, Justice Department Opposes Block on Contraceptive Mandate, 
USA TODAY (Jan. 3, 2014, 3:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2014/01 103/justice-department -sotomayor-block -contraceptive-mandate-obamacare-
aca/4303277 I. 
63. See Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell, supra note 61. 
64. Alan E. Garfield, The Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving a Sensible Balance, 
114 COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 1, I (Jan. 23,2014), 
http://columbialawreview.orglcontraception-mandate_garfieldl. For the purposes of 
this Comment, the Mandate will only be analyzed under the RFRA. 
65. Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (mem.). 
66. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013), afJ'd sub 
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
67. Id. at 1124-25. 
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The District Court ruled against Hobby Lobby, finding that Hobby 
Lobby does not fit into any of the government's exemptions and that 
the RFRA does not extend to for-profit corporations.68 However, the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached a different conclusion 
and issued Hobby Lobby a preliminary injunction.69 Notably, the 
appellate court found, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the 
RFRA includes for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby.70 
Further, the court found that there was a substantial burden to 
Hobby Lobby because it would either have to (1) violate its religious 
beliefs and provide contraceptive coverage or (2) face steep penalties 
by failing to provide the contraceptive coverage. 71 With 13 ,000 
employees and fines of $100 per employee per day, Hobby Lobby 
would have to pay penalties close to $475 million a year.n 
Furthermore, the appellate court did not find that the contraceptive 
mandate was the "least restrictive means" of furthering the 
government's interest.73 While the court did not deny the public 
interest that may be served through the Mandate, the court noted that 
there are already exemptions that allow numerous other entities to 
avoid the Mandate.74 Remarkably, the court also rebutted the 
government's assertion that Hobby Lobby was imposing its views on 
its employees.75 
Conversely, in Conestoga, the Third Circuit reached a different 
result than in Hobby Lobby.76 Conestoga is a closely held, for-profit 
corporation that manufactures wood cabinets and wood specialty 
products, with approximately 950 full-time employees. 77 The 
corporation is owned and operated by the Hahns, who are practicing 
68. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. SebeJius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1296 (W.D. Okla. 2012), 
rev'd, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff'd sub nom. BUIWell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
69. 723 F.3d at 1147. 
70. 723 F.3d at 1129; 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of 
Congress, unless the context indicates othelWise ... the words 'person' and 'whoever' 
include[s] corporations .... "). 
71. 723 F.3d at 1141. 
72. Jd. at 1140-41. 
73. Jd. at 1144. 
74. Jd. at 1143-44. 
75. Jd. at 1144. 
76. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), rev'd sub nom. BUIWell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
77. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (E.D. Pa. 
2013), aff'd sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), rev'd sub nom. BUIWell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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Mennonite Christians. 78 The Hahns' "faith requires them to operate 
Conestoga in accordance with their religious beliefs and moral 
principles."79 "Conestoga provides employees with a health 
insurance plan that covers a number of women's preventive health 
expenses, such as pregnancy-related care, routine gynecological care 
and testing for sexually transmitted diseases."8o However, 
Conestoga, through its owners, refused to provide coverage for 
contraceptives and any drugs used to "abort" pregnancy. 81 
In Conestoga, the court held that corporations are inherently 
incapable of exercising the sort of free exercise of religion that the 
RFRA protects. 82 The court noted that there has not been any legal 
precedent where a for-profit, secular corporation was itself found to 
have free exercise rights. 83 
In granting consolidated review of Conestoga and Hobby Lobby, 
the Supreme Court reviewed whether the mandate violated the 
sincerely held religious beliefs of owners of closely held for-profit 
corporations under the RFRA.84 
III. APPLYING THE RFRA TO THE MANDATE 
A. Background o/The RFRA 
The RFRA was enacted by Congress to reinstate the compelling 
interest test of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as 
set forth m Sherbert v. Verner85 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.86 In 
Sherbert v. Verner, the Court overruled the state's denial of 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 402-03. 
80. Id. at 403. 
81. Id. 
82. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 388 ("Our conclusion that a for-profit, secular 
corporation cannot assert a claim under the Free Exercise Clause necessitates the 
conclusion that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot engage in the exercise of 
religion. Since Conestoga cannot exercise religion, it cannot assert a RFRA claim. "). 
83. Id. at 384-85. 
84. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
85. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
86. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Congress enacted the RFRA as a response to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith, where the Supreme Court declined to apply the compelling interest 
test in favor of a rational basis test when deciding whether a former employee, 
terminated after using peyote for religious purposes, could legally be denied 
unemployment benefits. 494 U.S. 872,874,882-85 (1990), superseded by statute, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb-l (2012), as recognized in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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unemployment benefits to a Sabbatarian who refused to work during 
the Sabbath. 87 The Court refused to apply a rational basis test and 
instead applied a compelling state interest test. 88 In Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, Wisconsin state law required children to attend public or 
private school until the age of sixteen.89 However, some Amish 
families refused to let their children attend school past the age of 
fourteen. 90 The Court reaffirmed the compelling interest test from 
Sherbert and found that although the law was a neutral law of general 
applicability, the law "unduly burdens the free exercise ofreligion."91 
Congress enacted the RFRA as a response to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith.92 In Smith, the Supreme 
Court refused to apply the compelling interest test and instead applied 
a rational basis test to an employee who was denied unemployment 
benefits after being fired for using peyote for religious purposes.93 
The Court's decision in Smith drew significant criticism from the 
public, which prompted Congress to pass the RFRA in an attempt to 
squash the Court's decision in Smith.94 The RFRA provides that the 
"[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's free exercise 
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability,"95 unless the government can demonstrate that the 
application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest. 96 
B. Corporations as "Persons" under RPRA 
In a world where "anything is possible," it is hard to fathom, even 
in the twenty-first century, that an amorphous, for-profit entity can 
exercise religion; however, that is precisely what the Court found in 
Hobby Lobby.97 Prior to the Court's recent decision in Hobby Lobby, 
87. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-401, 409-10 (1963). 
88. Id. at 405-06 ("[C]ondition[ing] the availability of benefits upon this appellant's 
willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes 
the free exercise of her constitutional liberties. "). 
89. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,207 (1972). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 215,220. 
92. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (\997). 
93. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-90. 
94. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.c. § 2000bb(a)-(b) (2012). 
95. Id. § 2000bb-1(a). 
96. Id. In Flores, the Supreme Court added the "least restrictive means" prong to prior 
free exercise jurisprudence. Flores, 521 U.S. at 515-16. 
97. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768-69 (2014). 
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it had yet to extend the RFRA to corporations.98 Thus, as a threshold 
issue, the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga cases hinged on whether 
secular, for-profit corporations can exercise religion within the 
meaning of the RFRA.99 Previously, the courts encountered 
difficultly reconciling this issue in light of varying statutory 
interpretation and the absence of defmitive case law. 100 
While other federal statutes, such as Title VII and the American 
with Disabilities Act, specifically carve out exceptions for employers 
that are "religious corporation[ s], association[ s], educational 
institution[s], or societ[ies]," the RFRA solely mentions "persons."lol 
The aforementioned federal statutes indicate that if Congress 
intended the RFRA to encompass secular, for-profit organizations, it 
may have drafted the RFRA accordingly. 102 However, the Court in 
Hobby Lobby found that because the RFRA does not define the tenn 
"person," the Court must defer to the Dictionary Act, in order to 
identify a meaning. 103 The Dictionary Act provides that "[i]n 
detennining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context 
indicates otherwise ... the words 'person' and 'whoever' include 
98. See id. 
99. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) and 
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120, 1146 (lOth Cir. 
2013) cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) and aff'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); see supra Part II.D.2. 
100. The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly address the non-profitlfor-profit distinction in 
detennining whether for-profit activity precludes an organization from claiming 
religious protection under the RFRA. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that it is "conceivable that some 
for-profit activities could have a religious character, so that religious discrimination 
with respect to these activities would be justified in some cases"); Spencer v. World 
Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a faith-based humanitarian 
organization was eligible to receive the Title VII exemption, in part because it did not 
engage in for-profit activity). 
101. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2012) (stating that the prohibition on discrimination 
on the basis of religion does not apply to an employer that is "a religious corporation, 
educational institution, or society" under Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(l)-(2) 
(providing that the ADA does not prohibit a "religious corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society" from giving preference in employment to 
individuals of a particular religion under the ADA); Cj 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) 
("[GJovemment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion .... ") 
(emphasis added). 
102. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
103. ld. at 2768-69 (majority opinion). 
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corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, 
and joint stock companies, as well as individuals."104 
As a result of this interpretation, the Court decided that the RFRA 
includes corporations. 105 However, the Court should not have 
deferred to the Dictionary Act for a meaning of the word "person" in 
the RFRA because when read in context, the Court could discern an 
alternate meaning. 106 As the Hobby Lobby dissent points out, there is 
no pre-Smith "free exercise" or RFRA case law to lend on the notion 
that free exercise rights pertain to for-profit corporations because the 
exercise of religion is characteristic of natural persons, not artificial 
entities. \07 
C. The Contraception Mandate Does Not Substantially Burden the 
Free Exercise of Religion 
Although the Court found that for-profit entities may exercise 
religion within the meaning of the RFRA, \08 the next step of the 
analysis required a determination as to what extent the contraceptive 
mandate burdened the entities' sincerely held religious beliefs. \09 
When conducting an analysis under the RFRA, courts tend to defer to 
Free Exercise cases decided prior to Employment Division v. Smith 
for guidance on the "substantial burden" standard under the RFRA.IIO 
The Supreme Court has explained that a substantial burden exists if 
the receipt of an important benefit is conditioned upon conduct 
proscribed by a religious faith, or where the benefit is denied because 
of conduct mandated by a religious belief. III F or example, in 
104. 1 U.S.C. § I (2012). 
105. 134 S. Ct. at 2768-69. 
106. The Dissent notes that "[ w ]hether a corporation qualifies as a person capable of 
exercising religion is an inquiry [that] cannot [be] answer[ed] without reference to the 
'full body' of pre-Smith 'free-exercise caselaw.'" Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
107. Id. at 2793-94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
108. Id. at 2768-69 (majority opinion). 
109. Id. at 2775-76. Only "substantial" burdens on the exercise of religion trigger the 
RPRA. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000bb-l(a) (2012). 
110. Pre-Smith cases embody the same standard as that codified by Congress in the RPRA. 
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (finding that disqualification of 
unemployment benefits based on religious beliefs imposed a "[substantial] burden on 
the free exercise of appellant's religion"); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. 
Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981) ("Where the state conditions receipt of 
an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies 
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief ... a [substantial] 
burden upon religion exists. "). 
111. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18 (finding a substantial burden when an employee had to 
choose between adhering to his religious beliefs or stop working). 
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Sherbert v. Verner, the Court found it to be a substantial burden to 
deny a Sabbatarian, who was fired for not working on the Sabbath, 
unemployment benefits. 112 
Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder the Supreme Court found that the 
law impennissibly forced Amish parents to choose between sending 
their children to school in violation of their religious tenets and 
criminal prosecution. 113 
Unlike the aforementioned cases, the Mandate does not coerce 
those who object to the Mandate to personally participate in the use 
of contraceptives, and the burden should be construed narrowly. 
Those who claim that the Mandate poses a substantial burden on their 
exercise of religion do so on the basis that the funds that they 
contribute to a group health plan may ultimately subsidize someone 
else's participation that is condemned by the corporation's religious 
beliefs. 114 
However, it has long been recognized that the private and personal 
decision to use contraceptives rests solely with the employee, not the 
employer. 1 15 An employee must decide to seek contraceptives, a 
doctor must exercise their best judgment and prescribe the most 
appropriate contraceptive, and a phannacist must ultimately decide to 
dispense the contraceptives. 1 16 Thus, there are a series of independent 
events that must occur for a person to ultimately receive 
contraceptives, in which the employer does not participate. This 
series of events renders any burden to the employer too attenuated to 
result in a substantial burden.117 
In addition, when an employer did not provide contraceptive care 
under the pre-mandate health insurance system, employees had to pay 
for contraceptive care, including supposed "abortifacient[s]," out-of-
112. 374 u.s. at 404. 
113. 406 U.S. at 218-19. 
114. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (making a metaphor about paying 
taxes that may subsidize war); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 
1153 (lOth Cir. 2013), aff'd, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014), remanded to Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 13-1144,2014 WL 4467879 (3d Cir. 2014). 
115. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (recognizing that intervening 
choices of third parties separate the employer from the conduct the employer wishes 
not to endorse); see Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779-80. 
116. Birth Control Pills, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.orgthealth-
infolbirth-controllbirth-control-pill (last visited Jan. 11,2015). 
117. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1175-76 (Briscoe, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); accord Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 
414-16 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
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pocket, most likely from the salaries they received from their 
employers, or chose to forego such care due to monetary 
constraints. I 18 An employee is not usually subjected to their 
employer's religious beliefs when it comes to how they choose to use 
the benefits they have earned through their employment. 119 The new 
system was merely a substitute of one form of compensation for 
another as the payment source for contraceptives. 120 Therefore, the 
Mandate stands apart from the cases where the law imposed a 
penalty, because the individual refused to personally engage in the 
activity that ran counter to the religious belief. 121 Employers are still 
able to exercise their religion unencumbered. 
Under these circumstances there is surely a distinction between 
forcing individuals to use contraceptives and mandating for-profit 
corporations to participate in a system that ultimately provides 
contraceptives to someone else. However, the opponents of the 
Mandate have clearly made meritorious claims that the Mandate does 
pose a substantial burden on their exercise of religion. 122 The Hobby 
Lobby court found that there was indeed a substantial burden placed 
on these corporations because of the financial penalties faced if they 
did not provide the mandated coverage, which violates their religious 
beliefs. 123 However, what the Court failed to recognize is that these 
employers are not only imposing their views on their employees, but 
impeding access to necessary contraceptives. Despite the Court's 
finding that the Mandate poses a substantial burden to the 
complainants' sincerely held religious beliefs, it should still have 
found that the Mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering a 
compelling governmental interest. 
118. See Conestoga Wood, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 414. 
119. See id. 
120. Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. I: 12-CV-1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *6 (W.O. 
Mich. Dec. 24, 2012), aff'd, 730 FJd 618 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated, Autocam Corp. v. 
Burwell, 124 S. Ct. 2901 (2014). 
121. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-09; Verner, 374 U.S. at 403-04. 
122. Cf Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,715-16 (1981) 
("Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."). 
123. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014). The Court 
refused to address the merits of the owners' actual claims because the reasonableness 
of their religious beliefs is not within the province of the Courts. Id. at 2778. 
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IV. PROTECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH IS A COMPELLING 
GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST WHICH IS SIGNIFICANTLY 
ADV ANCED BY THE MANDATE 
The RFRA explicitly permits the government to "substantially 
burden a person's exercise of religion" if the burden "is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest."124 As explained in United States v. Lee, an Amish carpenter 
was compelled to participate in a social security system that violated 
Amish religious beliefs. 125 The Supreme Court found that although a 
burden existed, the burden was justified by the Government's 
compelling state interest. 126 Similarly, although the Court found that 
there may have been a substantial burden to the employers' religion, 
the Government's compelling interest in public health justifies any 
burden that the employers may experience. 127 Furthermore, the 
Government has a compelling interest in protecting individual health 
and social welfare. 128 
Similarly, the Hobby Lobby Court assumed that the Government 
has a compelling interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four 
challenged contraceptives. 129 While the majority did not delve into 
specific reasons as to why the interest is compelling, the dissent 
didYo The dissent identified interests that are "concrete, specific, 
and demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence."l3l Specifically, 
the dissent asserted that "the mandated contraception coverage would 
enable women to avoid the health problems that often accompany 
unintended pregnancies and their children."132 Most importantly, the 
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)-(2) (2012). 
125. 455 U.S. at 256-57. 
126. See id. at 258-60 (finding that the Government has a compelling "interest in assuring 
mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the social security 
system"). 
127. See id. at 260-61; Buchwald v. Univ. ofN.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487,498 (10th 
Cir. 1998). 
128. See, e.g., Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1989). However, it is crucial 
to note that the majority in Hobby Lobby "dismisse[d] Lee as merely a tax case." 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, 1., dissenting). The dissent, on the other 
hand, noted that "the Court recognized in Lee that allowing a religion-based 
exemption to a commercial employer would 'operat[e] to impose the employer's 
religious faith on the employees.'" [d. (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 261). 
129. Hobby Lobby, l34 S. Ct. at 2780. 
l30. See id. at 2799. 
l31. [d. 
l32. [d. 
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coverage helps safeguard the health of women for whom pregnancy 
may be hazardous, and the mandate secures benefits wholly unrelated 
to pregnancy, preventing certain cancers, menstrual disorders and 
pelvic pain. 133 While "Hobby Lobby and Conestoga resist coverage 
for only 4 of the 20 FDA-approved contraceptives," the compelling 
interests are not lessened. 134 
A. Unintended Pregnancies Are Highly Prevalent in the United 
States 
Approximately half of all pregnancies in the United States are 
unintended. 135 An unintended pregnancy is a pregnancy that is 
mistimed, unplanned or unwanted at the time of conception. 136 
Although unintended pregnancy occurs among women of all 
incomes, educational levels and ages, it is more common in women 
aged 18 to 24 years who are unmarried, have low income, are not 
high school graduates and who are members of a racial or ethnic 
minority group. 137 
Women who experience an unintended pregnancy tend to delay 
prenatal care and continue risky behaviors that could harm the 
developing fetus because they may not be aware that they are 
pregnant. 138 These women tend to have poor maternal nutrition, 
smoke and consume alcohol, are depressed, and experience domestic 
violence during pregnancy. 139 Comparatively, women who 
experience planned pregnancies are more likely to seek prenatal care 
and take affirmative steps to have a healthy pregnancy, such as 
changing their diets to increase the likelihood of a healthy child and 
discontinuing risky behaviors. 14o 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 2799-80. 
135. Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 2013), 
http://guttmacher.org/pubsIFB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html. 
136. Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zoma, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States: 
Incidence and Disparities, 2006, CONTRACEPTION (Aug. 24, 2011), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmclarticies/PMe3338192/ # In _sectitle. 
137. See CLOSING THE GAPS, supra note 19, at 102. 
138. Id. at 103. 
139. Denise D' Angelo et aI., Preconception and Interconception Health Status of Women 
Who Recently Gave Birth to a Live-Born Infant: Pregnancy Risk Assessment 
Monitoring System (PRAMS), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 14, 
2007), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtmllss561 Oa l.htrn. 
140. See Office of Women's Health, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 
Preconception Health Pregnancy: Why Preconception Matters, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV 
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancylbefore-you-get-
pregnantlpreconception-health.htrnl. 
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In addition, there are also very adverse outcomes for the children of 
unintended pregnancies. Births stemming from unintended 
pregnancies can result in birth defects and low birth weight. 141 
Children from unintended pregnancies are also more likely to 
experience poor mental and physical health during childhood, have 
more behavioral issues in their teen years, and lower educational 
attainment. 142 Aside from the negative health and economic 
consequences that unintended pregnancies have on women and their 
children, there is also a burden on the public. The public costs of 
births resulting from unintended pregnancies were $11 billion in 
2006. 143 
B. Contraceptive Use Is Critical In Reducing Unintended 
Pregnancies 
Effective family planning, through the use of contraceptives, is 
critical in mitigating the adverse individual and societal outcomes of 
unintended pregnancies. Approximately 43 million, or 
approximately 70 percent, women nationwide are at risk of 
unintended pregnancy.l44 Nearly all sexually active women, across 
all religious denominations, use contraceptives at some point. 145 
However, many women misuse or fail to use them consistently due in 
part to their inability to continuously fund contraceptives. 146 The 
high costs associated with contraceptive care and limited access to 
insurance coverage has been cited as one of the greatest barriers to 
effective and consistent contraceptive use. 147 Approximately one-
third of women would change their contraceptive method if costs 
141. Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Family Planning: Healthy 
People 2020, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, http://www.healthypeople.govI2020/topics-
objectives/topic/family-planning (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. These costs include prenatal care, labor and delivery, post-partum care, and 1 year 
of infant care. Id. 
144. Jo Jones et aI., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CURRENT 
CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006-2010, AND CHANGES IN PATTERNS 
OF USE SINCE 1995, at 16 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchsldatalnhsr!nhsrtl60.pdf 
Childbearing years are between the ages 15 to 44. Id. 
145. See Contraceptive Use in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (June 2014), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tb_contr_use.html. 
146. Id. 
147. Adam Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services and 
Supplies Without Cost-Sharing, GUTTMACHER INST. (2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/ 
pubslgpr/14/11gprl40107.hnnl. 
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were not a factor. 148 For example, the cost of an IUD, one of the 
contested contraceptives, is nearly a month's full-time pay for 
workers earning minimum wage. 149 As a result of the high cost of 
IUDs, women are 11 times less likely to obtain an IUD than women 
who had to pay less than $50.150 
In light of these troubling issues, the government established 
federal health and insurance programs, which aim to increase the 
amount of planned pregnancies by including contraceptive care 
among covered preventive services without costS.1 51 For example, 
Healthy People 2020, which sets health goals for the nation, included 
a national objective of increasing the proportion of pregnancies that 
are intended from 51 to 56 percent by 2020. 152 In addition, Healthy 
People 2020 set a goal to increase the number of insurance plans that 
offer contraceptive supplies and services. 153 Eliminating cost barriers 
to contraceptives would ultimately reduce the prevalence of 
unintended pregnancy in the United States. Therefore, the Mandate 
furthers the government's compelling government interest in public 
health by knocking down the cost barriers of contraceptive coverage 
and thus, making it more accessible to those who are most at risk. 
V. ERADICATING GENDER DISCRIMINATION IS A 
COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST WHICH IS 
SIGNIFICANTLY ADVANCED BY THE MANDATE 
The Supreme Court has held that where a state action burdens First 
Amendment interests, the law may be justified if it promotes gender 
equality, which is a compelling state interest, through the least 
restrictive means possible.1 54 The Court has recognized that the 
148. Jennifer E. Frost & Jacqueline E. Darroch, Factors Associated with Contraceptive 
Choice and Inconsistent Method Use, United States, 2004,40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & 
REPROD. HEALTH 94, 98 (2008). 
149. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2800 (2014) (citing Brief for 
Guttmacher Inst. & Professor Sara Rosenbaum as Amici Curiae in Support of Gov't, 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 
WL 333890, at *5). 
150. Id. (citing David Eisenberg et aI., Cost as a Barrier to Long-Acting Reversible 
Contraceptive (LARC) Use in Adolescents, 52 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S59, S60 
(2013)). 
lSI. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 254(b)(1)(A)(i)(III)(gg) (requiring federally funded health 
centers to cover family planning care); Healthy People 2020, supra note 141. 
152. Healthy People 2020, supra note 141. 
153. Id. 
154. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609 (1984). 
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"importance, both to the individual and to society, of removing the 
barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration 
that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including 
women."155 
Because of women's unique reproductive capacities, women need 
more health services during their childbearing years and ultimately 
face higher medical costs than their male counterparts. 156 The impact 
of these higher health care costs, including the costs of 
contraceptives, is further exacerbated by women's lower incomes. 157 
On average, women only earn 77 cents for every dollar earned by 
men. 158 These financial barriers to health care, coupled with 
gendered income disparities, lead women to forego necessary 
medical care at a higher rate than men. 159 The ACA, and the Mandate 
promulgated therewith, will effectively eradicate gender disparities in 
the health care industry. However, the war on the contraceptive 
mandate compromises the society-changing benefits the Mandate 
promotes. 
VI. THE MANDATE IS THE LEAST RESTRICTNE MEANS OF 
FURTHERING THE GOVERNMENT'S COMPELLING 
INTERESTS 
While the Court in Hobby Lobby did indeed find that that the 
Mandate advances a compelling government interest,160 the Court 
was not persuaded by the Government's argument that the Mandate is 
the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. 161 The 
155. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626. 
156. See Rustgi et aI., Women At Risk: Why Women Are Forgoing Needed Health Care, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 11, 2009), available at httpj/www.commonwealthfundorgi 
PubJicationsllssue-BriefS/2009/May/Women-at-Riskaspx. 
157. See CLOSING THE GAPS, supra note 19, at 19. 
158. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET. AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY & 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 11 (2013), available 
at http://www .census.gov/newsroomlpress-releases/20 13/cb 13 -165.html. 
159. See CLOSING THE GAPS, supra note 19, at 125. A 2010 Commonwealth Fund Survey 
found that 44 percent of adult women (compared with 35 percent of adult men) either 
reported that they had a problem paying medical bills or indicated that they were 
paying medical debt over time. RUTH ROBERTSON & SARA R. COLLINS, THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, REALIZING HEALTH REFORM'S POTENTIAL-WOMEN AT RISK: 
WHY INCREASING NUMBERS OF WOMEN ARE FAILING TO GET THE HEALTH CARE THEY 
NEED AND How THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT WILL HELP 1, 6, 21 (May 2011), 
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/mediaiFileslPubJications/Issueo/020Brief/ 
2011IMay/1502_Robertson_women_at_riskJeform_brief_v3.pdf. 
160. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780; see supra Part IV-V. 
161. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a}-(b)(2012). 
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Government was required to show that the proposed alternatives to 
the Mandate are more restrictive (or not viable), in order to advance 
its interests. 162 The least restrictive means argument advanced by 
HHS did not prevail because the majority found that the Government 
could assume the cost of providing the contraceptives at issue to any 
women who are unable to afford them, which the Court found to be a 
less restrictive means. 163 Further, the Court noted that HHS already 
has a system in place for nonprofit organizations with religious 
exemptions,164 however, the majority opinion failed to decide whether 
this approach would comply with RFRA.165 
The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby failed to address the 
impracticalities and ramifications of the proposed alternatives, which 
were highlighted in the dissent. The dissenting opinion found that the 
Government showed that there is "no less restrictive means that 
would both (1) satisfy the challengers' religious objections to 
providing insurance coverage for certain contraceptives; and (2) carry 
out the objective of the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement, 
to ensure that women employees receive, at no cost to them, the 
preventive care needed to safeguard their health and well-being."166 
Importantly, the dissent noted that "[a] 'least restrictive means' 
cannot require employees to relinquish benefits accorded [to] them 
by federal law in order to ensure that their commercial employers can 
adhere unreservedly to their religious tenets."167 
When Congress passed the ACA, it chose to build on the existing 
system of workplace-based health coverage and private insurance. 168 
It was proposed that the "government could provide contraceptive 
services to all women free of charge (through Medicaid or another 
program), establish a government-funded health benefits program for 
contraceptives services, or force drug and device manufacturers to 
provide contraceptive drugs and devices to women for free."169 In 
response to these suggestions, the Departments stated that they lack 
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(2). 
163. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 ("The most straightforward way [to provide access 
to the contested contraceptives] would be for the Government to assume the cost of 
providing [them] to any women who are unable to obtain them under their health-
insurance policies due to their employers' religious objections."). 
164. Id. at 2782. 
165. See id. at 2780. 
166. Id. at 2801-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
167. Id. at 2802. 
168. See Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 39,870 (Jul. 3, 2013) (codified in 45 C.F.R. pts. 147 and 156). 
169. !d. at 39,888. 
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the statutory authority and the resources to implement those 
proposals.!70 
The suggestion that the government should provide contraceptive 
coverage to employees of objecting religious employers seems like a 
less restrictive means than the Mandate because there are some 
women who receive publicly funded contraceptive care.!7! However, 
this alternative is impracticable because it would be far too expansive 
and costly. Public expenditures for family planning totaled $2.37 
billion in 2010, 88 percent of which was federally funded. 172 If the 
government funded contraceptives on its own, it would require an 
increase in federal funding. In light of the current political battles, it 
seems unlikely that such a proposal would pass in Congress. 
Nevertheless, the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby failed to take 
these factors into consideration when it considered this alternative as 
a "less restrictive means." 
Furthermore, the proposed alternatives would create administrative 
barriers for women seeking contraceptive services.!73 Interfering 
with women's receipt of benefits by requiring that they take steps to 
become informed of the proposed alternative, separately enrolling, 
and ultimately making that coverage less accessible to women is not 
what Congress contemplated. !74 Another suggestion involved giving 
tax incentives for women to use contraceptive services.!75 Like the 
other proposals, a tax incentive would not advance the government's 
compelling interest because it would place a greater burden on 
women seeking the benefit. Women would not only have to pay for 
the coverage out-of-pocket in the first instance, but they would have 
to file more paperwork. As Justice Ginsburg states in her dissent, this 
departure from the existing employer-based system of health 
insurance would do nothing for the woman too poor to be aided by a 
tax credit, again ultimately undermining the purpose of the 
170. Jd. 
171. See Facts on Publicly Funded Contraceptive Services in the United States, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 2014), http://www.guttmacher.orglpubsl 
fb_contraceptive_serv.html (showing that nine million women receive publicly funded 
contraceptive services). 
172. Jd. 
173. Coverage of Certain Preventative Services, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,888. 
174. See id.; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2802 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
175. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2803. 
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mandate. 176 Furthermore, the Departments lack the statutory 
authority under the ACA to implement such a policy. 177 
Given these considerations, the Court should have found that that 
the Mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering the 
government's compelling interests in safeguarding public health and 
promoting gender equality. With the finalized rules carving out 
exemptions for religious employers and only requiring coverage of 
necessary preventive health services, there is no better way to tailor 
the law without compromising the government's interests. 
VII. A DECISION OF "STARTLING BREADTH": REACTION TO 
THE COURT'S DECISION AND IMPACT ON 
BENEFICIARIES AND POTENTIAL FUTURE CLAIMS 
Justice Ginsburg begins her poignant dissent by justifiably 
identifying the Court's decision as one of "startling breadth."17s In 
fact, the dissent identifies the Court's disregard of the impact that the 
exemption sought by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga has on the 
significant interests of the corporations' employees and their 
dependents.179 Not only does the current holding impose the 
corporations' owners' views on the employees, it denies them of a 
statutory benefit conferred upon them by Congress. Further, the 
dissent looks to the future implications that the Court's decision will 
have in future litigation, with respect to extending RFRA to for-profit 
corporations. ISO 
In light of the Court's startling opinion in Hobby Lobby, Senate 
Democrats introduced legislation to narrow the RFRA.ISI The bill 
sought to prevent companies from using the RFRA to avoid 
complying with the Mandate. 182 However, the Senate bill was 
defeated 56-43 on a procedural vote. 183 House Democrats have also 
introduced a similar bill to "fix the damage done by the Supreme 
176. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
177. See id. at 2787-89, 2802-04 (referencing the Food and Drug Administration, as well 
as the Department of Health and Human Services, Ginsburg asserts that the tax credit 
alternative offered by the Court in the present case and in Conestoga is not authorized 
by the statute and would actually be detrimental to the purpose of the ACA). 
178. Id. at 2787. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 2797 & n.19 (citing Andrea Murphy, America's Largest Private Companies 
2013, FORBES, http://www.forbes.comlsites/andreamurphy/20 13/12118/americas-
largest-private-companies-2013/ (last updated Dec. 18,2013)). 
181. Protect Women's Health from Corporate Interference Act of 2014, S. 2578, l13th 
Congo 
182. Id. §§ 2-3. 
183. 160 CONGo REc. S4535 (daily ed. July 16, 2014) (cloture motion vote). 
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Court's decision to allow for-profit corporations to deny their 
employees birth control coverage."184 The bill is titled "Protect 
Women's Health From Corporate Interference Act of 2014" and 
seeks to ensure that employers cannot interfere in their employees' 
birth control and other health care decisions. 185 
In the interim, the Obama Administration issued its proposed new 
rules, open to comments, to satisfy the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Hobby Lobby.186 The new rules limit the mandate as required by the 
Hobby Lobby decision, but also ensure that women who are affected 
by the ruling would continue to have access to coverage. 187 Further, 
the proposed rules describe two alternative approaches for defining a 
closely held for-profit entity that has a religious objection to 
providing such coverage. 188 "Under one approach, the entity could 
not be publicly traded, and the ownership of the entity would be 
limited to a certain number of [employers]."189 Under an alternative 
approach, the entity could not be publicly traded, and a certain 
proportion of ownership would be concentrated among a certain 
number of owners. 190 
The proposed new rules are also seeking comments on how for-
profit entities should document their objections to the contraception 
coverage. 191 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Currently, the Mandate's scope remains in flux with the pending 
bill in the house and the proposed new rules. However, the Mandate, 
as it stands, strikes an appropriate balance between religious freedom 
184. Protect Women's Health from Corporate Interference Act of2014, H.R. 5051 113th 
Cong.; Hobby Lobby: Murray, Udall Introduce Legislative Fix to Protect Women's 
Health in Aftermath of Supreme Court Decision, U.S. SENATOR PATTY MURRAY 
WORKING FOR WASH. ST., http://www.murray.senate.gov/publiciindex.cfinl2014mhobby-
lobby-murray-udall-introduce-iegisiative-fix-to-protect-women-s-health-in-aftermath-of-
supreme-court-decision (last updated July 9, 2014). 
185. H.R. 5051 §§ 1-2. 
186. Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 166,51122 (Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified as 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
187. See id. at 51118,51121. 
188. Fact Sheet: Women's Preventative Services Coverage, Non-Profit Religious 
Organizations, and Closely-Held For-Profit Entities, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIOlResourcesIFact-Sheets-and-FAQslwomens-
preven-02012013.html (last visited Jan. 11,2015). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
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and the importance of access for preventive health care for women. 
While this is a federal matter that implicates the RFRA, for-profit, 
secular corporations should not have been able to successfully object 
under RFRA because the practice of religion should not be able to 
apply to amorphous beings through their employers. Furthermore, 
employers should not be imposing their religious beliefs on 
employees who do not necessarily hold the same beliefs. 
Despite the Court's finding that the secular, for-profit entities are 
able to bring claims under the RFRA and that there is a substantial 
burden to them because of the Mandate, the Court should have found 
that the Mandate advances the government's compelling interests in 
the least restrictive manner. To date nearly 45 million women have 
accessed these preventive health services under the ACA. 192 The 
Court's ruling will effectively stifle the advancement of the public 
health and gender equality. 193 
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